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AQUINAS ON FAITH AND SCIENCE
Kenneth J. Konyndyk

Aquinas's reflection on the relationship between faith and science took place
amidst serious controversy about the acceptability of the very form of science
Aquinas had adopted. Aquinas uses the Aristotelian conception of science
and his own view of the place of theology and faith, to produce arguments
for the compatibility of reason and science. I examine the arguments he
presents in the Summa Contra Gentiles, and I criticize details of his arguments, but I endorse what I see as his general strategy.
The assimilation of the philosophy and science of Aristotle by Northern
Europeans during the thirteenth century was a contentious business, nowhere
more so than at the University of Paris where St. Thomas Aquinas spent a
substantial part of his academic career. The major metaphysical writings of
Aristotle, which had been lost to the medievals for several centuries, were
just becoming available in Latin to Europe in the late twelfth and early
thirteenth centuries. But because the commentaries accompanying his works
were from Islamic philosophers, Aristotle came tainted by association with
Islam. The medievals were accustomed to using commentaries on philosophical texts when they lectured on those texts. But because Aristotle came to
them after centuries of being the preserve of Islamic philosophers, the only
available commentaries were by Islamic philosophers, and not surprisingly
this association led to a certain suspicion of Aristotle.
Even worse, on three major points Aristotle affirmed positions no orthodox
Christian could hold. He allegedly taught that the world is eternal, that it has
always existed; he seemed to think that the soul is mortal, not surviving the
death of the body; and he held that God pays no attention to what goes on in
this world. In 1215, 1220, and again in 1231 it was forbidden to lecture on
books of Aristotle at Paris, and throughout the century there were condemnations of propositions, many of which were taken from Aristotle, culminating in the infamous Condemnation of 1277.
Despite these drawbacks, Aristotle seemed to many of the European medievals who studied him to be the wisest, most learned, most scientific thinker
they had ever encountered. Of course, this immediately raised for them the
question of how Christian faith relates to rational thought, especially science,
since the most "scientific" thinker they knew appeared to reach scientific and
philosophical conclusions that contradict the Christian faith.
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Aquinas comes to these questions as a convinced Aristotelian and as a
convinced Christian. He aims to show that faith and reason are neither separate, logically unconnected spheres, nor logically at odds with each other, but
that they must be perfectly compatible. He thus holds not only that Aristotle's
philosophy (i.e., for him the most reasonable available philosophy) must not
contradict any articles of the Christian faith, but also that theology can be
done scientifically, in Aristotle's sense of science. Aquinas argues for compatibility at the beginning of his Summa Contra Gentiles, and tries to exhibit
the scientific character of theology, including its being the completion or
perfection of the other sciences, in the opening question of the Summa
Theologiae. In the course of his Summas Aquinas also tries to show how
Aristotle's philosophy does not necessarily lead to the three theologically
unacceptable positions and how his philosophy provides an intellectual
framework well suited both to articulating the Christian faith and to displaying its rationality.
In this paper, I will present some of Aquinas's main arguments from the
Summa Contra Gentiles, Book I, Chapter 7 for the compatibility of faith and
reason, particularly as applied to science, and I will show how his conception
of theology as a science (using the Summa Theologiae) and his way of understanding Aristotle so as to avoid charges of heresy exemplify the solution
he favors in those arguments.
I will begin, however, by describing in Parts I and II what Aquinas thinks
faith is and what reason, and especially the highest product of reasonscience (scientia), is in his sense. After I consider his arguments for compatibility, I will conclude with some criticisms of those arguments, even though
I accept and endorse what I see as the basic impulse behind his position.

I. Aquinas's Concept of Faith
When he considers religious faith, Aquinas looks at both the act (or state) of
faith and the object of faith. We can and do refer to a certain act as faith
(having faith), but we also commonly describe what we believe as "the faith,"
or the articles of faith. Aquinas gives a detailed analysis of each of these
senses of 'faith' in his extensive treatment of faith in the first sixteen questions of the second part of the Second Part of the Summa Theologiae.!
An act of faith is an intellectual act, believing (credere) in the sense of
firmly assenting to something that we have thought over (cum assensione
cogitare).2 Christian faith in particular is the act of willingly assenting to or
believing something moved by divine grace out of a desire for eternal life.
On the scale of the acts of the intellect, faith, like belief, falls below knowledge (scientia-the highest act of the intellect) and stands above opinion-assent which is less firm. Faith's assent is unshakable or certain, making it
superior to opinion, where assent is mixed with some fear that the opposite
may be true. Faith's unshakability derives from divine grace, distinguishing
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it from knowledge, where unshakable assent is produced by the strength of
our "vision" of what is known (or, as we might say, the evidence). Although
faith's degree of confidence is by no means inferior to that of knowledge
(S. T, I, Q I, 5), faith ranks lower because the assent is not produced by the
intellect's clear vision of the truth, but requires some kind of assistance. 3
Faith can also be distinguished from other beliefs whose "unshakability"
derives from more ordinary sources, such as the testimony of a trusted friend
or parent, or some evidence that we find strongly credible.
When Aquinas talks about the Christian faith or the articles of the Christian
faith, he thinks of faith in terms of judgments or propositions expressing the
content of Christian belief. Nevertheless, it is also customary and proper to
regard God as object of faith in three senses: 1) faith is taking God's word
for something, so it is believing God (as the source of the information); 2)
faith is a set of beliefs about God; and 3) faith has God as its proper objective
and goal, so that faith desires God rather than someone or something else. 4
Although God is the object of faith in these senses, we ordinarily apprehend
God by means of truths about Him, and this is a consequence of the way our
intellect works. There is another way of apprehending objects, namely, grasping or understanding their form or essence, but this way of understanding
God, which constitutes the beatific vision, is available to us only through the
grace of God. Even in heaven our natural powers of knowing are riot adequate
to knowing the essence of God. So our way of apprehending God in this life
is through various judgments, propositions, about God. Faith, in the sense of
"the faith," consists of many propositions that God has revealed. Some of
these truths that God has specially revealed are knowable without special
revelation, by some people anyway, and Thomas refers to these truths as the
praeambula fidei. 5 The faith, strictly speaking, consists of those revealed
articles (propositions) and their consequences to which we have no scientific
access and which must be accepted without proof. 6 Therefore, I take it that
Aquinas does not regard the belief that God exists or that there were lepers
in Palestine and fish in the Sea of Galilee as articles of The Faith. That God
exists is presumably part of the science of Metaphysics, and the other examples mayor may not be included in science. Obviously, not everything implied by articles of faith is also an article of faith.
The act of faith, as he describes it, consists of the act of believing what
God has revealed,7 moved by the Holy Spirit and our desire for eternal life.
The act of faith also involves trust and love: we trust God when we accept
his revelation, and our love of God informs our acceptance and motivates it.
But, Thomas concludes, the genus of the act of faith is belief, not love or
trust.
Faith is both an act and a set of beliefs, and the same will be true for reason.
Thus when discussing the relationship between faith and reason, we have to
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consider both a relationship between sets of beliefs, and the compatibility of
attitudes or activities. In addition to asking about the compatibility of beliefs,
we should ask whether engaging in the act of faith is compatible with the
rational regulation of one's beliefs.

II. Reason
Reason, as Thomas thinks of it, may be a faculty-the intellect-or the result
of that faculty's operation. Ratio, perhaps the main word translated as "reason," also refers to the proportioning of the mind to the thing, an idea Thomas
takes seriously. The intellect's cognition of the essences of things is a proportioning of this sort, as is judging and reasoning about things. One of the
primary senses of the word as Thomas uses it is to denote reasoning and the
knowledge acquired by inference. 8 Reasoning is the movement of the intellect
toward understanding (S. T., I, Q79, Art. 8). Reliance on reasoning as a means
of understanding is proper (peculiar) to human beings, distinguishing them
not only from animals, who lack this ability, but also from other types of
intellectual beings-angels and God-who know immediately and without
inference, and so do not need this ability. Reason may also refer to other sorts
of knowledge, including probable knowledge; it can be anything intuited by
the intellect with certainty (including knowledge of "first truths"), and it can
refer to science-certitudes demonstrable on the basis of "first truths." The
knowledge that constitutes science, according to St. Thomas, is of this latter sort.
One kind of certaint/ attributed to knowledge (scientia) is a function of
its clarity or its evidence, and this certainty is, as it were, passively acquired.
In cases of intuitive and demonstrative knowledge, the will is not a factor in
effecting assent; the evidence produces the intellect's assent (note that it is
the intellect that does the assenting, not the will), so that presented with the
evidence (or the understanding of the "terms" in the case of truths per se
nota 10) the intellect gives its assent automatically and nonvoluntarily, in the
sense of not involving the will rather than being contrary to the will. The will
seems to be an inferior faculty (S. T., I, Q82, Art. 3).
When Aquinas asks about faith and reason, there are a number of questions
he may be dealing with. He may be asking whether believing the articles of
the Christian faith is compatible with the activity of drawing conclusions
rationally (that is, whether a person committed to being reasonable could
permit herself to believe anything by an act of faith). Or he may be concerned
with whether the articles of faith are or could be incompatible with scientifically established conclusions. Or he may be concerned with whether there is
any kind of overlap between the articles of faith and scientifically demonstrable conclusions, or between articles of faith and rationally self-evident
truths. I think that we see Aquinas addressing all of these questions in the
opening chapters of the Summa Contra Gentiles.
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There we find chapters devoted to arguing that it is appropriate for God to
reveal (and hence for humans to believe) theological truths that are scientifically knowable (I, 4), that it is appropriate for God to ask humans to assent
to things that are beyond their capacity to demonstrate scientifically (and
even understand, e.g., the Trinity and Incarnation) (I, 5), and that it is not
foolish to assent to articles of faith, even if they are beyond the reach of
rational investigation (I, 6).
If we look just at what is known or believed, however, we see that there is
an area of overlap: in addition to things that are known by all and things that
must be accepted on faith by all, there is a set of beliefs which may be
accepted on faith but which also are capable of being known. These beliefs
constitute the praeambula fidei, mentioned earlier. The articles of faith,
strictly speaking, are those beliefs available only to faith in this life. They
stand above human scientific knowledge (as Divine knowledge), and the
preambles belong in between. as articles that are revealed along with the
articles of faith, but which are knowable by reason as well, at least by some
people.!!
The area of overlap is significant for the issue at hand. It shows that some
of the teachings that are revealed along with the articles of faith are not only
compatible with what human reason knows scientifically (in his sense) but
they are part of that know ledge. While this does not imply that all the teachings of the Christian faith are compatible with everything that reason discovers, it is a source of encouragement nonetheless. When Aquinas treats faith
and reason in the sec, he exploits the overlap. He begins by observing that
there are two different ways of obtaining truths about God: from revelation
and from "the natural reason." God has good reasons for permitting some
people to believe the ones that are knowable and he has good reasons for
asking all of us to believe the unknowable ones. And even though we lack
evidence for the truth of these unknowable truths about God, it is not irrational to accept them, since there are various testimonies to their truth. At
this point Aquinas offers arguments that what reason knows must be compatible with the revealed articles of faith that remain beyond the reach of our
reason. Perhaps it should also be noted that Aquinas clearly thinks that many
revealed articles both are and will remain beyond the reach of human reason
in this life.
In spite of the area of overlap, we must also remember that faith, strictly
understood as the act of believing on the basis of a will moved to assent by
the work of the Holy Spirit,!2 and Reason, the act of knowing first principles
or knowing scientifically, are mutually exclusive in the sense that the same
individual cannot both know that something is the case and believe it by faith;
we either know it or believe it, but not both. However, it is possible for one
individual to accept something by faith while another knows it, and likewise
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it is possible for the same individual to accept a belief by faith at one time
and later come to know it. So the act of faith and the act of knowing are
exclusive with respect to any given belief by any given individual at a given
time. Consequently, the same individual cannot both believe by faith and
know by reason the same article at the same time.

III. The Arguments for Compatibility
Aquinas's strategy for justifying faith focuses primarily on content, for that
is where the serious questions arise. Faith, which is an act of believing on
the basis of an authority, is simply necessary for human life. None of us has
the time or opportunity to learn from scratch everything we need to know,
and so we constantly avail ourselves of the reports of others. Of course this
introduces interesting possibilities of error; reporters may lie, misperceive,
misreport, distort, be unduly selective or overlook crucial details in passing
along information. But most of the time, we, or someone, can check up on
what is being reported. The information can be verified by someone (although
not by anyone) if he or she cares to take the time and trouble. Nevertheless,
some reliance on testimony is indispensable, since none of us can check on
everything ourselves.
The articles of the Christian faith present a special problem in this regard,
however. On the one hand it is claimed that it is necessary to believe these
articles in order to enjoy the highest and happiest life. But on the other hand,
these articles cannot be independently verified by anyone. Is God triune?
There is no way to check up on this that does not involve divine revelation.
So with these beliefs, we may not simply be adopting a shorter, more convenient way of acquiring useful beliefs, but we may be bypassing scientific
evidential processes altogether.
Aquinas addresses this issue in SCG, I, Chapter 6, just before he argues for
the compatibility of the content of Christian faith with reason, where he
argues that the adoption of Christian beliefs is compatible with regulating
one's beliefs by reason. It is reasonable, he says, to adopt a set of beliefs that
have been attested to by miracles, inspiration of simple people; fulfillment
of prophecy, widespread acceptance of a call to a higher life, and the obviousness that these beliefs call one to a higher life. These considerations show
that Christian belief is not foolish, even though the content of these beliefs
is not accessible by rational means.
Chapter 7 of the SCG, Book I, presents four arguments that the truths of
reason are compatible in content with the truths of faith. The fact that the
teachings of faith lie beyond verification and even full comprehension by
reason does not deter Aquinas from trying to make an argument for compatibility. Furthermore, it is interesting that these arguments appear at the beginning of a book intended to help unbelievers, that is, persons who do not accept
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the Christian revelation. Is he guilty of begging the question and simply
presupposing that this revelation is true? An unbeliever might regard the
"conclusion" reported in the chapter heading ("the compatibility of the truth
of reason with the truth of faith") as a trivial and uninteresting conclusion on
the grounds that there are no truths of faith and that is the reason for the
compatibility. But as we have just noted, Aquinas takes himself to have
presented reasons in the previous chapter (6) for accepting this particular
revelation as true, and also for rejecting Mohammed's alleged revelation as
not worthy of credibility. So we should look at chapter 7 as arguing that we
should regard this genuine revelation, whose content does not overlap with
reason and which reason is therefore unable to verify (in the sense of demonstration), as fully compatible with reason.
A. Thomas's first argument trades on the idea that since each category
consists of truths, they have to be compatible. The argument goes roughly
like this:
I.

We are incapable of thinking the deliverances of reason, Le., propositions per se nota, to be false.

2.

Therefore, we cannot help but believe that the deliverances of reason
are true.

3.

The articles of faith are confirmed in a divine way Gust argued in Ch.
6).

4.

Any claim that has divine confirmation must be regarded as true. 13

5.

Therefore, we must regard the articles of faith as true.

6.

Only the false can be opposed to the true (from the definitions of 'true'
and 'false').

7.

Therefore, (we must believe that) the articles of faith are compatible
with the deliverances of reason.

Given Thomas's references to what we are capable and incapable of believing
«(1) and (2» and what it is permissible and impermissible to believe «4) and
(5», I understand the conclusion to have prescriptive force, as claiming that
we are obliged to believe in the compatibility of faith and reason. This first
argument emphasizes that each category consists only of truths, and therefore
they must be compatible. The point of thinking is to acquire knowledge of
the truth, according to Thomas, and our cognitive equipment is designed to
be in touch with truth. How and why this is so has to be described and argued,
and Aquinas turns to that later. 14 For the moment, his point is simply that we
think this is so and we cannot help but think so. We cannot get ourselves to
believe that something has been intuited or demonstrated and yet is not true.
(Aquinas would have had trouble with Meditation I.) When we take ourselves
to know something, we take it to be true. Likewise, when we accept the
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articles of the faith, we do so because we take them to be divinely confirmed,
as coming from God (Aquinas thinks Chapter 6 has provided this evidence).
Thus we cannot take these articles as anything but true. But truths must
always be compatible with truths, as anyone who knows the meanings of the
words "true" and "false" knows (this is one of the first principles of thought),
and therefore anyone who accepts the articles of faith as God's revelation
must believe them compatible with what reason knows.
At first glance, this argument seems to be absolutely right, and perhaps one
may wonder who could disagree with it, unless one rejects the premise that
there are divinely confirmed articles of faith, or thinks that we do not take
scientific conclusions to be true. But I believe that the argument may have a
genuine target, both in Thomas's era and our own. Thomas assumes that there
is one unified system of truth into which all truth fits; he is therefore rejecting
a view of some of his contemporaries on the Arts Faculty at Paris, sometimes
labelled Averroism, and which Fernand van Steenberghen calls "radical Aristotelianism." These people " ... taught the philosophy of Aristotle [using Averroes as the main interpreter] without concerning themselves with the points
of opposition which exist between this philosophy and Christian doctrine."l5
Thomas may be taken by extension to be rejecting views which makes theological views noncognitive, those which make theology and science separate
"language games," and also complementarist views of religion and scientific
knowledge which relegate each to different and non-intersecting spheres of
inquirr In our own century, perhaps Donald McKay16 and the later Wittgenstein l might be examples of contemporary variations on Averroism.
While this first argument for compatibility seems right, it also may seem
less than fully helpful. Just why becomes clearer when we ask what Thomas
must mean by "faith" and "reason" here. It is clear that he is thinking of the
articles of the faith and those things that we know (cognita). It is important
to take the word "know" very seriously in this context. In presenting the
premises, Aquinas appeals to our inability to take these claims as false. We
are unable because of the way evidence bypasses the will when we know
things. Now this inability comes into play only when our know ledge is selfevident (per se nota) or demonstrative-deduced from self-evident first principles. Thus the argument does not assure compatibility for that knowledge
which is "probable," which is firmly believed, supported by good evidence,
but is not self-evident or deductively demonstrable. Many cases of apparent
conflict, however, involve the area of the "probable," and the argument gives
no guidance as to the source of the error nor does it even claim that there
must be an error in reasoning in such cases. However, the argument does
seem to me to have the salutary effect of making the believer expect that faith
and reason, at least with respect to the truths of faith and the truths of reason,
have to be compatible.
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Aquinas's position, it must be granted, does claim something substantial:
there cannot be a conflict between the teachings of the Christian faith and
anything that we know. Therefore, if there appear to be conflicts, we must
have made a mistake. We had better check back over our reasoning and see
if we can discover our error. Thomas does assume that the error must be in
our reasoning (our making inferences from the "first principles" of our science, including possibly the inferences from the first principles of theology,
although he never uses that as an example). Either any incompatibilities are
apparent but not real, or if they are real, they are due to an error in reasoning.
Apparent incompatibilities may arise when we take probable conclusions as
fully scientific, i.e., deducible from first principles.
This is the way Aquinas resolves one of the difficulties he faces. Aristotle
was taken by many of his contemporaries to teach that the world has always
existed, contrary to the article of faith that the world has a beginning in time.
The problem disappears, says Aquinas, when we check Aristotle's reasoning
and discover that his argument involves probable reasoning and is not a
deductively conclusive proof. On the other hand, Aquinas also attacked the
Augustinian tradition's philosophical arguments against a beginningless created world. Neither position, he thinks, can be philosophically demonstrated.
But because the articles of faith decisively teach that the world has a beginning, this is the position the believer must take, even if Aristotle's arguments
are the best reasoning we have. 18 An examination of the relevant reasoning
shows that the eternity of motions is not securely known and there is no
conflict between scientific knowledge and the articles of faith.
Another substantial claim of St. Thomas's position is that conflict take the
form of logical incompatibilities. He does not concern himself with competing frameworks, incommensurability, etc. This is not, I believe, because this
sort of thing never occurred to him, but because he thinks foundationally, and
therefore he thinks any alleged perspectival difference will cash itself out as
an incompatibility somewhere down the line. Once this happens, we will have
to go back and see whether we can isolate its source, a possibly daunting
task. If a science is incomplete, that is, if we are unable to make explicit the
foundational structure from top to bottom, we may find it impossible to get
to the bottom of some incompatibilities.
I said earlier that I agree with Aquinas's argument here. But I should say
exactly what I think I have agreed to. I think his argument does not commit
me to saying that theological conclusions can never conflict with scientific
conclusions. The argument does commit me to say that the first principles of
science (where these self-evident and necessary principles have been correctly ascertained by us) cannot conflict with the basic principles of theology,
wl:;ich is "the knowledge of God and the blessed,,19 as that has been revealed
to us, and consequently that what has been correctly deduced from these sets
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of first principles cannot be incompatible. Assuming that the sciences (both
the science of theology and the other sciences) are fairly complicated, there
is no assurance that if an incompatibility showed up, it could be tracked down
very quickly or easily. Aquinas's position does not assure us of quick or easy
answers. But he does insist that a Christian must hold that there is compatibility at bottom; we cannot accept the possibility that there might be two
truths incompatible with each other.
B. In his second argument, Aquinas concludes that because revelation and
reason both have God as their source, they have to be compatible. He argues
as follows:
1.

Whatever a teacher introduces into the mind of a student is first in the
mind of the teacher. (Unless his teaching is "fictitious," which cannot
be said of God.)

2.

God is the author of our nature.

3.

Therefore, God has planted in us (Le., taught us) the knowledge of the
principles we know naturally.

4.

Therefore, these principles are part of the divine wisdom.

5.

Therefore, whatever is opposed to these principles is opposed to the
divine wisdom.

6.

Nothing opposed

7.

But the articles of faith come from God.

8.

So the articles of faith cannot be opposed to the divine wisdom, and
therefore they cannot be opposed the principles we know naturally.

to

the divine wisdom can come from God.

God's wisdom has to be consistent, and so, therefore, do the aspects of it that
God has seen fit to give to us. This argument presupposes that there is a God,
that this God created us with the cognitive abilities we have, and that this
God has revealed himself. Besides this we have to agree that God possesses
all scientific knowledge and whatever else we may know naturally. These
assumptions would have been acceptable to Aquinas's Jewish and Islamic
audiences as well as his Christian students, and so we may regard them as
aimed at Jewish and Islamic believers, who were (ironically) the gentiles for
whom the SCG was written.
The second argument claims that because the articles of faith come from
God and the basic principles of our knowledge come from God (as the author
of our nature), all of this knowledge must be compatible in the divine wisdom.
The argument uses as a premise that God knows everything he teaches. It
need not be true in general of an honest teacher that the teacher knows
everything that she teaches, although Thomas seems to think so. A teacher
might try and might even succeed in teaching something she does not know
herself. And a teacher might succeed inadvertently in teaching something she
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didn't know, without dissembling or faking. So to buttress Aquinas's argument, let us assume that God knows everything that he teaches. Furthermore
on certain conceptions of knowledge, it is impossible to know something that
is not true; on such conceptions it follows that everything that God teaches
is true, even without assuming God's goodness. Given this assumption, since
the principles of reason and the teachings of faith both come from God, they
are both part of his knowledge and hence compatible. It is clear, of course,
that theology comes from God in a fairly direct way. But Aquinas holds that
God is our teacher (quite literally, if the argument is to work) in making us
so that we know certain things about our world, about him, etc. We are
designed for scientific knowledge; it is not accidental. The " ... knowledge of
the principles that are known to us naturally has been implanted in us by God;
for God is the Author of our nature."20 Thus, says Thomas, God knows these
principles himself. Of course God also knows the articles of faith, since they
literally have their origin in God's knowledge (S.T., I, Qt, Art. 2), so both
articles of faith and the principles of reason are known by God who can know
no falsehoods, especially contradictions. A contradiction or incompatibility
is literally inconceivable; it cannot even be thOUght by a clear, unconfused
mind. Since God thinks both the truths of faith and the principles of reason,
and his mind is clear and unconfused, faith and reason are not incompatible.
This second argument seems less persuasive than the first. Perhaps there
are suspicions attaching to it just because it seems so similar to an argument
Descartes gives at the end of Meditation III and beginning of IV for the
reliability of our faculties. 21 Descartes tried to argue that the nondeceptive
character of God guarantees that we have no faculty that would lead us astray
if we use it properly. Aquinas might be said to need such an argument here,
since we need some reason to believe that our cognitive faculties, especially
those involved in grasping the first truths of the sciences, continue to function
in the way they were designed to by their Creator, and we need reason to
think they were designed with truth in mind. But these observations serve to
bring up the main reason why Aquinas's argument here is weak. The fact that
God is the author of our nature and that God made our senses and intellect
to function as they do does not entail that God teaches us what we know. The
leap from maker to teacher is too great; the fact that God made us in such a
way as to learn certain things does not prove that God teaches us those things.
Nor does it follow, as I already observed, that if someone tries to teach p to
someone else, the teacher must know it first.
To defend Aquinas just a bit here, we should observe that he only needs to
say that whatever principles we know are taught to us by God and taught
reliably. All the same, it is possible (consistent) that God designed things so
that certain principles would ineluctably be believed and that believing them
is for our good, without it following that these principles are true. The principles may be taught reliably without having to be true. Aquinas also assumes

14

Faith and Philosophy

that our faculties continue to function just as they were designed to; he does
not entertain the possibility that we have, through our own evil, interfered
with the functioning of our cognitive faculties in a systemic way, affecting
even our ability to apprehend principles. Thus it is possible that God is the
author of our nature and we have done something to make it malfunction.
C. The third argument considers the hypothesis that "contrary cognitions"
(contrariae cognitionei 2 ) were somehow planted in us by God. Among "contrary cognitions" Thomas presumably includes first principles that lead to
incompatible conclusions. If we found ourselves being led to contrary conclusions in this way, we would be unable to accept either starting point. This
is what he means when he writes our intellect would be "chained" and it
would miss out on the truth (assuming that one of the beliefs is true 23 ). Since
God would not make us miss out on the truth, he has not planted (immitterentur) any contrary cognitions in us. Therefore, faith (revelation) and reason
cannot be incompatible.
Since this argument depends in its essentials on the previous ·argument, I
shall not pursue it further.
D. Aquinas bases his fourth argument for compatibility on the nature of
our knowing and the contention that this will remain constant as long as the
rest of nature does, together with the belief that God does not try to get us
to believe the impossible. It is, according to Aquinas, impossible for us to
believe something that is obviously necessarily false. He refers to contradictions and incompatibilities as "inconceivable" and I think he means that
literally: given our nature, our minds are literally incapable of conceiving
such a thought. I think it is understood that the incompatibility is clear and
apparent; Aquinas does not think that we have special incompatibility detectors that help discern the presence of hidden contradictions. Our nature is
what leads us to accept various first principles, from which our scientific
knowledge is derived. This acceptance is involuntary in the sense that we
cannot withhold assent from these principles once they are clear to us. It is
unchangeably part of our nature. If God were to "implant" in beings of this
sort a set of beliefs contrary to these principles or their logical consequences
(e.g., by revealing them as articles of faith), they would be in the position of
havin~ to conceive the inconceivable or to think a thought that thought cannot
think, 4 or we would have obviously contrary opinions existing in the same
knowing subject at the same time.
This fourth argument, while not identical to any of the previous three, does
not seem to me to add anything substantial to those arguments,. and all the
materials (i.e., premises) needed for this argument may be found in the previous ones, except for the idea that what is natural does not change as long
as nature does not change.
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IV. Aristotelian Science and the Faith
As an Aristotelian, Thomas had to contend with fellow Aristotelians who were
ignoring the tension between Aristotle and certain teachings of the church.
His project is both to defend Aristotle and defend orthodoxy. Although Aquinas's advice in Book I, Chapter 7, suggests that he would readily reject
Aristotelian "science" at the allegedly heterodox points, this is not what he
does. When Aquinas considers Aristotle's teaching on the eternity of the
world, he labors mightily to save the science (i.e., Aristotle's argumentation)
despite the apparent incompatibility between Aristotle's conclusion and
Christian doctrine of creation ex nihilo. His "solution" seems to commit him
to finding a mistake in Aristotle's reasoning, or something has been "incorrectly derived from the first and self-evident principles ... " (SCG, I, 7, [7])
by his colleagues in their readings of Aristotle. But Thomas fir:st looks for
room between dogma and science. John Wippel, in an interesting and useful
artic1e,25 shows that Aquinas not only looks for room in this way, he also
shifts his position somewhat as he examines sources and sifts arguments
during his successive treatments of the eternity of the world. Initially, in his
Sentence Commentary, he suggests that even Aristotle did not intend to argue
for the eternity of the world, but he only wanted to show that arguments
against eternity were not scientific demonstrations. 26 Later, says Wippel,
Aquinas backed off from this "more benign reading" of Aristotle. Thomas
also consistently attacked the teaching that creation in time is demonstrable
(e.g., St. Bonaventure and other Neo-Augustinians). Wippel concludes,
In sum, then, it appears that in Thomas's eyes, one cannot demonstrate either
eternity or noneternity of the world. The Christian can only accept the
noneternal character of the same as a matter of religious belief. 27

In the end, Thomas follows his strategy; he does not reject science or any
scientific argument or observation. Instead he finds science unable to demonstrate anything one way or the other on this question, and so the door is
open to resolution by revelation. Thus Aristotle has not necessarily made a
mistake, and if the Christian had nothing else to go on, a reasonable course
of action might be to believe that the world has always existed?8 But as it
happens, the Christian does have something else to go on, the clear revelation
of Creation, and so does not accept what might otherwise be reasonable. On
the other hand, because he accepts the unity of truth and the propriety of
relying on God as a source of information, St. Thomas does not follow
enlightenment evidential ism in allowing only evidence of the senses and
reason to determine what he believes.
When Aquinas deals with the immortality of the soul, he observes that
Aristotle's position is less than totally clear, but that Aristotle provides the
makings of an argument for immortality, at least for the immortality of the
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agent intellect, even if he fails to draw that conclusion himself. The issue
here then focuses on whether the agent intellect is One in all of us or whether
there is personal immortality. So again, instead of finding a conflict between
reason and faith and choosing one or the other, Aquinas works to eliminate
the apparent incompatibility. However, I think it is clear that this time Thomas
finds it necessary to do some revision of Aristotle. Even so, he works to
"save" as much Aristotle as he can.
Thomas's practice, then, is to try to save science as much as he tries to save
the faith. He never seems to automatically respond simplistically or with a
formula that rejects science. On the other hand, we do not find him suggesting
that we reject or revise articles of the faith, although he has not ruled that
out in principle. Insofar as he holds that the church decides the content of
theology and does so infallibly, there is little or no scope for such revision.
Aquinas's attitude is what one would expect from someone who sees each of
the sciences as having a secure and (relatively) independent evidential base.

V. Do the Arguments Help?
The help St. Thomas does offer us is just like the help he might offer in the
case of conflict between any two sciences: you must have made a mistake;
go back over your work, reconsider your evidence, and make sure you have
not drawn any conclusions not fully demonstrated by your premises. This
help is exactly what you would expect from one who holds his conception of
a science. Each science begins from necessary and immediate first principles
which we cannot help but accept. Any conflict of the conclusions of one
science with those of another, or any conflict within a science has to be due
to some mistake. Faith is involved in the acceptance of the first principles of
theology; it is the only science that does not receive its first principles either
directly from the operation of the intellect or from another science whose
principles are traceable back to the intellect. So Aquinas offers arguments
designed to establish the compatibility of theology's first principles with the
first principles of the other sciences. Once that conclusion is established, then
theology is, so to speak, on at least as good a footing as every other science.
When its conclusions conflict with those of other sciences, therefore, we
should assume that somewhere, somehow, we have made a mistake in the
derivation of a conclusion. Aquinas also appears to assume in Chapter 7 of
SCG, Part I, that the mistake will be in the reasonings of the nontheological
science, although no reason is given in this passage why we should make that
assumption.
So given his epistemology and his theory of the structure of science, Aquinas's solution to the problem of potential conflict between reason and faith
is just exactly what one should expect and it is eminently sensible. Of course,
the solution is simpler to state than it may be to apply in practice; it may be
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exceedingly difficult in practice to discover the errors in one's reasoning.
Fallacies can be subtle and apparent only to a few, as Aquinas suggests is the
case with the issue of the eternity of the world, and perhaps also with personal
immortality. His solution, while affirming the integrity of faith, does not
necessarily always cut in favor of the science of theology. Aquinas's practice
in dealing with the issues of his own day favors careful thinking that finds
some truth in the erroneous positions, so that opponents do not have to be
branded as heretics or fools (something Christian practice today might do
well to emulate). I suppose, too, although Aquinas does not say so, that if we
find science to be in an insufficiently well-worked out state, we should not
be too quick to decide that it is in conflict with faith. No doubt some research
programs are going to be more appealing to Christians than others, but some
open-mindedness may be necessary until all the connections become clear.
Although we can appreciate the sensible character of much of Aquinas's
advice, in the end I think his position has several serious defects for present
day Christians trying to deal with these issues. I want to call attention first
to some of the defects in his philosophy of science, and then look at some
defects in his view of human thinking more generally.
One of the more serious objections to Aquinas's solution to the problem of
conflicts between faith and science is its reliance on an unacceptable epistemology and an antiquated view of the sciences. Aquinas links a certain deductive structure of science, proceeding as it were axiomatically from
postulates and first principles (axioms?), with an epistemology of science or
theory of justification. Thus we know scientifically and fully justifiably because we see the links between the claim under consideration and the first
principles. Of course, this may not be the order of our discovery of these
claims, but that is another matter. Even if we take the sciences to have the
axiomatic type of structure that Aquinas's position suggests, it is quite clear,
especially in the case of mathematics (one of the sciences more readily
axiomatizable) that the axioms and postulates we settle on will not always
commend themselves as self-evident (per se nota). Self-evidence is not always one of the main criteria for choosing axioms or postulates when we are
giving axiomatizations. What is worse, some claims that one would have
thought were per se nota and candidates for axioms or postulates have been
shown to lead to notorious logical paradoxes. For example, it might seem that
the property of non-self-exemplification should be able to be exemplified,
but it cannot. In short, it appears that it will not work to try to get an axiomatic
structuring of science to coincide with the sort of theory of justification that
Aquinas wants. Because Thomas's arguments for compatibility are based on
this structure, rejection of the structure means that certain key premises in
his arguments must be rejected.
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A second way Aquinas has of dealing with incompatibilities, which I have
touched on only briefly in this paper, is to discover that our arguments for
incompatible conclusions are probable arguments, that is, arguments which
make plausible or highly probable a given conclusion, but fall short of demonstration, where a demonstration is a straightforward deduction of the gi ven
conclusion from the premises. One can see why this might be ~n attractive
solution for someone holding Aquinas's theory of the structure of science,
but once again it is of almost no use to us. Not only does it once again
presuppose an outmoded view of science, it is also unattractive in dealing
with the problems we have to face. For it appears that most of the scientific
challenges to theistic belief are based quite directly on probable reasoning.
Yet pointing this out hardly seems to alleviate the difficulty we experience.
It bothers us that scientific evidence suggests that humans evolved from other
life forms while the theological evidence suggests that humans are unique
and special creations, and it does not help much to be told that the scientific
evidence is, of course, only probable here, and so we are not logically committed to an incompatibility in our thinking. While we do view the theories
of science as strongly and consistently probable on their evidence, we do not
think this is a weakness that renders scientific conclusions less firm than
theological ones. Perhaps this is seen as a weakness by some of our contemporaries who are wont to say, "Well, it's only a theory," and feel perfectly
consistent in preferring their theology to some scientific point. But I think
this simple answer is failing to take science seriously enough.
Aquinas not only holds that the first principles, the principles per se nota,
that constitute the starting points for the sciences are certain, he also assumes
that they are clear. Indeed, it is their clarity that renders them irresistible.
However, when we look at our starting points in theology, the Scriptures, and
in the sciences, those empirical observations, we find ambiguities, uncertainties, problems of understanding and interpretation. This is a question that will
be better discussed by a proper philosopher of science than by me; my only
concern here is to note that there are notorious problems of understanding
and interpretation in choosing and in interpreting data in the sciences as well
as in theology. And as soon as we admit that there are difficulties of interpretation, then questions arise about what may and may not legitimately
influence our interpretations. It may be that theology can sometimes properly
influence science and the framing of scientific theories, and that scientific
conclusions can sometimes influence how the Scriptures are interpreted. I
myself think it unlikely that theology and science can be in principle understood completely independently of the other, especially if it is true that scientific theories (and perhaps theological theories as well) are underdetermined by the evidence for them.
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Finally, saving the best for last, I must enter a Calvinist caveat about our
cognitive abilities. Aquinas's whole account of this problem of the compatibility of faith and reason seems based on an idealization that here ignores the
possibility that there is something systemically wrong with our thinking, that
there might be patterns of unbelief that we are particularly prone toward, or
thoughts that we constantly avoid because of "the smoke of our wrongdoing,"
to use St. Anselm's colorful phrase. Are there factors that, due to our fallenness, we are led to overemphasize or underemphasize, or improperly bring
in or fail to bring in? If we appreciate the underdetermination of our theories
by the evidence for them, then the possibility that a theory may be skewed
by an improper or irrelevant factor is a real one. One notes the importance
of the theory of evolution to theorists who are intent on putting together an
atheistic world view. Might this not lead them to find certain ideas and assumptions more credible than if they did not have this interest? In Thomas's
defense, we should observe that elsewhere he has much to say about the
weakness of our intellect and our proneness to error, so he can hardly be said
to ignore completely human intellectual weakness. He might say that errors
of the sort just described will have to cash themselves out as bad premises
that will show up in reviews of the reasoning that led to an incompatibility.
But some of these factors will not show up as premises, but rather as dispositions to find premises credible or incredible.
Yet one of Aquinas's central assumptions is surely correct and must guide
Christian thinking on this topic as well: the assumption that all truth is one,
unified, and must fit together compatibly. Inconsistency means we have
trouble and need to straighten something out. In the long run we must either
drop a view or get some further explanation that shows how the apparent
inconsistency is only apparent and not genuine. However, for the short run,
we may be unable to come up with the required further explanation or see
why a view should be dropped, and simply find ourselves stuck. However
that may be, the assumption of consistenc~ is the basis of Aquinas's strategy,
and it must be the basis of ours as well. 2

Calvin College
NOTES
1. See also Aquinas's De Veritate, Q. XlV. For more exposition see the papers by
Konyndyk and Wolterstorff in Audi and Wainwright, eds., Rationality, Religious Belief,
and Moral Commitment (Cornell, 1986). There is a recent translation of the questions on
faith from the Summa Theologiae by Mark Jordan, Faith (Notre Dame, \990).

2. Aquinas considers Augustine's definition of belief as "to think with assent," and
concludes that when the proper distinctions have been made, this definition will do.
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Thomas first distinguishes several senses of 'thinking.' If 'thinking' is used to mean "any
actual consideration by the intellect," then defining belief as "thinking with assent" does
not yield a proper definition (it is not a sufficient condition) because it also applies to
knowledge. But if we take thinking to be "deliberation by the intellect (excluding senses)
accompanied by inquiry preceding a clear vision of the truth," then we can accept the
definition of belief as thinking (in this latter sense) with assent as adequate (necessary and
sufficient). Since knowledge need not involve inquiry and deliberation, the definition now
is sufficient, he thinks.
3. While knowledge is superior to faith in the final analysis, faith's (Le., theology's)
certitude is superior to that of human knowledge.S.T., I, QI, Art. 5.
4. This is expressed in S.T., II, II, Q2, Art. 2, as credere deo (believing God), credere
deum (believing about God), and credere in deum (believing for the sake of God). (The
translation in this note is Jordan's. See note 1).

5. S.T., I, Q2, Art. 2, ad 2.
6. Ibid. Perhaps this is also implicit in S.T., I, QI, Art. I, ad l.
7. Not limited to the narrow or strict set of articles of the Christian faith (or sacra
doctrina). See S.T., I, Ql, Art. I, ad 2.
8. As in s.T., I, Q79, and Question XV on higher and lower reason in De Veritate.
9. We might call this "subjective" certainty, or confidence, in order to make clear that
it refers to the state of the subject-the degree of confidence the subject has. Thomas holds
that there is another sort of certainty, call it "objective," or causal, which refers to the
cause or the basis of the belief. Since the basis or cause of faith is the Divine Truth, it is
more certain than knowledge and the other intellectual virtues produced by reason in the
objective sense, but because we have less clarity about faith than about what we know by
reason, and clarity is the source of confidence, reason may be subjectively more certain
than faith. However, the "objective" sense is primary, and is what we mean by certainty
when we speak of it "simply," that is, without qualification. See S.T., II, II, Q4, Art. 8.
10. Truths that are pe r se nota, sometimes translated as "self-evident," are described as
being "known as soon as the terms are known," in S.T., I, Q2, Art. I, Obj. 2., where the
first principles of demonstration are offered as examples, as well as "The whole is greater
than the part."
II. See the Summa Contra Gentiles, I, Chaps. 3 and 4, and the S. T., I, Q2, Art. 2, ad 1.
Aquinas usesthe terms sacra doctrina, preambles, the articles offaith, to refer to different
but overlapping set of propositions. The distinctions have their basis in the different ways
we have access to these propositions.
12. That is, the virtue of Christian faith, which is what Thomas is discussing in the
Summa. My characterization combines elements from II-II, Q. 4, Art. 1, and Q. 6, Art. 2.
13. I have supplied this premise which is required for validity and is clearly assumed.
14. See the S.T., I, QQ 79-86, and De Veritate, Q XlV.
15. St. Thomas Aquinas and Radical Aristotelianism (Catholic University of America
Press, 1980), p. 2.
16. See his The Clockwork Image (Intervarsity, 1974). In fairness, I must emphasize
that I said "perhaps." It is not completely clear that McKay holds this sort of position.

AQUINAS ON FAITH AND SCIENCE

21

17. I take the suggestion from Stuart Brown's "Christian Averroism, Fideism, and the
'Two-fold Truth,'" in The Philosophy in Christianity (Cambridge, 1989), edited by
Godfrey Vesey, 207-223.
18. Locke's position on probable conclusions in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book IV, Chapter 18, Section 9, is similar.
19. S. T., I, Q1, Art. 2.
20. SCC, I, 7, 2.
21. I have in mind Descartes's conclusion that "[God] surely did not give me the kind
offaculty which would ever enable me to go wrong while using it correctly," which occurs
in the course of his argument for the principle of clarity and distinctness at the beginning
of Meditation IV. (Using the translation in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, tr.
Cottingham, Stoothoff, and Murdoch (Cambridge, 1984), Vol. II, pp. 37-38.)
22. Pegis translates this as "contrary know ledges." I think that translation is misleading
here, and I do not follow it.
23. In the case of contrary beliefs this assumption is not necessarily justified; for
contradictory beliefs it is.
24. To borrow memorable phrases from George Bishop Berkeley and S<j>ren
Kierkegaard, respectively.
25. "Thomas Aquinas on the Possibility of Eternal Creation," in his Metaphysical
Themes in Thomas Aquinas (Catholic University of America Press, 1984), Chap. VIII,
191-214.
26. According to Ralph Mcinerny, Aquinas always accepted Aristotle's contention that
the world cannot have come into being in the same way that things in the world come into
being-by being produced by something which potentially is what actually comes to be.
If this were the only sense of coming to be, the world could not have come to be. To be
created is a very different sense of coming to be.
27. Ibid., p. 192.
28. St. Thomas does not seem to commit himself on whether there is probable argument
for both conclusions and on what, in the absence of revelation, the most reasonable course
of action in the present case would be. Wippel shows that he does not commit himself on
the issue of the possibility of eternal creation until the late De Aeternitate Mundi, and even
there certain textual problems complicate our understanding of Aquinas. Wippel, pp.
205-14.
29. An earlier and briefer version of this paper was presented at the Pascal Centre of
Redeemer College in August 1992. Kent Emery, Jr., Ralph Mcinerny, Alvin Plantinga,
Del Ratzsch, and Arvin Vos have given me helpful comments on subsequent drafts. I am
most deeply indebted to Norman Kretzmann, who commented extensively on the early
version, for suggesting improvements, saving me from numerous errors, and pointing me
to additional helpful sources.

